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OBDUSKEY V. MCCARTHEY & HOLTHUS LLP: 
DECLINING TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN 
JUDICIAL AND NON-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE 
IN FURTHERANCE OF THE FDCPA’S MISSION 
MOSHE Y. GUGENHEIM*© 
ABSTRACT 
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act was created to eliminate abusive debt 
collection practices and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers 
against debt collection abuses. The Act contains a general definitional provision 
subjecting those who fit under the definition to the Act’s requirements. Additionally, 
the Act contains a limited purposes provision for certain forms of debt collection 
which are subject to specific requirements. While in some instances it is clear as to 
who qualifies as a debt collector under the Act, in other instances it is less clear. One 
instance of ambiguity is the enforcement of security interests. From the Act itself, it 
is unclear if entities, such as law firms, who enforce security interests are considered 
debt collectors under the Act’s general definitional provision thereby requiring those 
entities to adhere to the Act’s various requirements. Due to a circuit split on the 
matter, the Supreme Court answered the ambiguity in Obduskey v. McCarthey.  
The Supreme Court held that entities enforcing security interests are not debt 
collectors as defined by the Act’s general definitional provision. Thus, law firms and 
other entities who conduct foreclosures are not required to follow all of the Act’s 
requirements. However, the Court cautioned that abusive debt collection practices 
could transform such entities into debt collectors under the Act. While the Supreme 
Court may have missed an opportunity to reconcile the circuit split by distinguishing 
between judicial and non-judicial foreclosures, the Court was correct to decline to 
make such a distinction since, by doing so, it protects debtors in spirit of the Act’s 
purpose. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus LLP, the Supreme Court addressed whether a 
business which is involved in the enforcements of security is considered a “debt 
collector” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act’s1 (“the Act”) general 
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definitional provision.2 In light of statutory construction, legislative history, and 
legislative intent, the Court held that an entity enforcing non-judicial foreclosure is 
not a “debt collector” under the Act’s general definitional provision.3 In reaching its 
conclusion, the Court missed an opportunity to reconciliate a circuit split by 
declining to distinguish between entities enforcing judicial versus non-judicial 
foreclosures.4 However, the Court was correct to decline to make such a distinction, 
as the Court’s analysis better protects debtors in the spirit of the Act’s primary 
purpose.5 
THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 
Congress enacted the Act in 1977 “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by 
debt collectors” and to “promote consistent State action to protect consumers 
against debt collection abuses.”6 There are two pertinent provisions defining debt 
collection under the Act: the general definitional provision (subjecting debt 
collectors to all of the Act’s requirements) and the limited-purposes provision 
(subjecting specific forms of debt collectors to specific requirements).7 
The Definitional Provisions 
The general definitional provision is found in 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6).8 That provision 
states that the term “debt collector” “means any person . . . in any business the 
principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects 
or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or asserted to be owed or 
due another.”9 The limited-purposes provision is found in 15 U.S.C. 1692(f)(6)  and 
states, “[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6) [the] term [debt collector] also 
includes any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is the 
enforcement of security interests.”10  
 
* Moshe Y. Gugenheim, J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, 2021. 
 1. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (2006). 
 2. Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP,139 S. Ct. 1029, 1033 (2019). 
 3. Id. at 1040. 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 101–122. 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 123–26. 
 6. Obduskey, 139 S. Ct. at 1040-41 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 7. Id. at 1035–36 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a),(6); § 1692(f)(6)). 
 8. Id. at 1035–37. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 1037. 
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I. THE CASE 
In 2007, Dennis Obduskey obtained a mortgage loan from Magnus Financial 
Corporation, secured by Obduskey’s property in Bailey, Colorado.11 The loan was 
subsequently acquired by Freddie Mac, and Wells Fargo Bank was assigned as the 
servicer.12 In 2014, after Obduskey defaulted on the loan, Wells Fargo retained 
McCarthey & Holthus LLP to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure13 on Obduskey’s 
property.14 McCarthey mailed Obduskey a letter that said it had been instructed to 
commence foreclosure against Obduskey’s property, disclosed the amount of the 
debt, and identified the creditor (Wells Fargo).15 Obduskey sent back a letter 
“invoking § 1692(g)(b) of the Act, which provides that if a consumer disputes the 
amount of a debt, a “debt collector” must “cease collection” until it “obtains 
verification of the debt” and mails a copy to the debtor.”16 Instead of sending the 
verification, McCarthey continued with the non-judicial foreclosure by filing a 
notice of election and demand with the county trustee.17 Obduskey filed suit 
alleging that McCarthey had violated the Act by not adhering to the verification 
procedure.18 
The district court granted McCarthey’s motion to dismiss reasoning that the 
majority view on the matter is that foreclosure activities are not covered under the 
Act.19 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, reasoning 
that the mere enforcement of a non-judicial foreclosure does not make one a debt 
collector under the Act.20 In light of a circuit split about the application of the Act to 
non-judicial proceedings, the Supreme Court granted Obduskey’s petition for 
certiorari.21 
 
 11. Obduskey v. Fargo, No. 15-CV-01734-RBJ, 2016 WL 4091174, at 1 (D. Colo. July 19, 2016), aff’d sub 
nom. Obduskey v. Wells Fargo, 879 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus 
LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, (2019). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Obduskey, 139 S. Ct. 1029 at 1034 (2019) (“About half the States also provide for what is known as 
nonjudicial foreclosure, where notice to the parties and sale of the property occur outside court 
supervision.”).The main difference between judicial and non-judicial foreclosure is that with non-judicial 
foreclosure, an entity such as a trustee conducts the sale as opposed to judicial foreclosure where the court 
conducts the sale. See id. 
 14. Fargo, 2016 WL 4091174 at 1. 
 15. Obduskey 139 S. Ct. at 1035. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. Under Colorado non-judicial foreclosure law one conducting a non-judicial foreclosure “must first 
mail the homeowner certain preliminary information, including the telephone number for the Colorado 
foreclosure hotline. Thirty days later, the creditor may file a ‘notice of election and demand’ with a state official 
called a ‘public trustee.’” Id. at 1034. 
 18. Id. at 1035. 
 19. Obduskey v. Fargo, No. 15-CV-01734-RBJ, 2016 WL 4091174 at 3 (D. Colo. July 19, 2016). 
 20. Obduskey, 139 S. Ct. at 1035. 
 21. Id. 
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II. THE COURTS REASONING 
In Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus, LLP, the Supreme Court unanimously held 
that an entity conducting a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding is not considered a 
debt collector under the general definitional provision of the Act.22 Justice Breyer, 
writing for the Court, based the Court’s ruling on three grounds: (1) statutory 
construction, (2) legislative history, and (3) legislative intent.23 Justice Breyer also 
discussed and rejected each of Obduskey’s arguments for why McCarthey was a 
debt collector under the Act.24  
A. The Court’s Reasons in Support of its Holding 
1. Statutory Construction 
The opinion starts with statutory construction.25 The Act defines a debt collector as 
one who “regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts.”26 
The proceeds of a foreclosure sale are given to a creditor to satisfy the debt.27 Thus, 
a business which conducts non-judicial foreclosure sales indirectly collects debt 
and, therefore, qualifies as a debt collector under the Act’s general definitional 
provision.28 However, the Act also contains a limited purpose definition when it 
says, “[for] purposes of section 1692(f)(6)…a debt collector also includes (a 
business) the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.”29 
This definition includes a business which conducts non-judicial foreclosure sales.30 
The limited purpose definition, therefore, makes it clear that a business conducting 
a non-judicial foreclosure is not included under the Act’s general definition of a debt 
collector or else the Act would be superfluous.31 
2. Legislative Intent 
The Court then turns to legislative intent.32 Congress likely structured the Act in a 
way which coincides with state non-judicial foreclosure schemes.33 The Act limits 
 
 22. Id. at 1040. 
 23. Id. at 1036–38. 
 24. Id. at 1038–40. 
 25. Id. at 1036–37. 
 26. Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus, LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1036 (2019) (citing §15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6)). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1036–37. 
 29. Id. at 1037 (citing § 15 U.S.C. § 1692(f)(6)). 
 30. See id. (holding that the limited-purpose definition encompasses “a business, like McCarthey” which 
enforces non-judicial foreclosures). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus, LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1037 (2019). 
 33. Id. 
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debt collectors from communicating consumer debt to third parties.34 However, in 
a foreclosure sale, the “purpose of publicizing a sale is to attract bidders, ensure 
that the sale price is fair, and thereby protect the borrower from further liability.” 
35 Congress created the Act to protect the debtor and a prevention of advertising a 
foreclosure sale would hurt the debtor.36 Thus, if businesses which conduct non-
judicial foreclosure sales were considered debt collectors under the Act, the Act 
would clash with state non-judicial foreclosure schemes.37 Therefore, Congress 
likely did not intend for those businesses to be considered debt collectors under the 
Act.38  
3. Legislative History 
Lastly, the Court turns to legislative history.39 When drafting the Act, there were 
two versions presented in Congress.40 One version explicitly included entities 
enforcing non-judicial foreclosures as debt collectors.41 Another version excluded 
non-judicial foreclosure sales from the Act.42 Thus, it makes sense that Congress 
compromised between the two drafts, subjecting entities enforcing non-judicial 
foreclosures as debt collectors only under the limited purpose section of the Act.43 
B. The Court’s Rejection of Obuskey’s Arguments   
1. Superfluity Argument 
Obduskey argued that the Act’s general definitional provision includes businesses 
that conduct non-judicial foreclosure sales.44 The limited purpose section, by 
specifying those enforcing security interests, does make the Act superfluous as the 
limited purpose definition was meant for “repo men” — those who seize collateral 
from the debtor’s property at night.45 Obduskey argues that repo men do not fit 
under the Act’s general definitional provision.46 The Court dismissed this argument 
reasoning that repo activity is an indirect collection of a debt since it is undertaken 
 
 34. Id. (citing § 15 U.S.C. § 1692(c)(b)). 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id.  
 38. Id.  
 39. Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus, LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1037-38 (2019). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1037. 
 42. Id. at 1038. 
 43. Id.  
 44. See id. 
 45. Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus, LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1038 (2019). 
 46. Id. 
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to collect some or all of the defaulted debt.47 Thus, “repo men” do fit under the 
Act’s general definitional provision.48 Therefore, if the enforcement of a security 
interest was included in the Act’s general definition, the Act’s limited purpose 
section would be superfluous.49 
2. Venue Argument 
Obduskey pointed to the Act’s venue provision which states, “[a]ny debt collector 
who brings any legal action on a debt against any consumer shall…in the case of an 
action to enforce an interest in real property securing the consumer’s obligation, 
bring such action only in a judicial district.”50 Since the provision includes judicial 
foreclosures, it must also include non-judicial foreclosures.51 The Court rejected this 
argument as well reasoning that the venue provision only speaks of judicial, and not 
non-judicial, foreclosures.52 Additionally, the venue provision merely references a 
debt collector who is conducting a foreclosure.53 It does not mean that one who 
conducts a foreclosure is a debt collector under Act.54 
3. Transformation into a Debt Collector Argument 
Obduskey argued that even assuming arguendo that a business conducting a non-
judicial foreclosure is not a debt collector under the Act, McCarthey transformed 
itself into a debt collector “by sending notices that any ordinary homeowner would 
understand as an attempt to collect a debt backed up by the threat of 
foreclosure.”55 The Court rejected this argument reasoning that if the non-judicial 
foreclose is not debt collection under the Act, then neither are the legal means 
necessary to carry out non-judicial foreclosure.56 Here, McCarthey was obligated 
under Colorado non-judicial foreclosure law to send the notices.57 Therefore, 
McCarthey did not act as a debt collector when sending the notices.58 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 1039 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(i)(a) (2006)) (emphasis added).  
 51. Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus, LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1039 (2019). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. 
 57. See Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus, LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1039 (2019). 
 58. Id. 
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4. Loophole Argument 
Lastly, Obduskey argued that the Court’s decision excluding businesses conducting 
non-judicial foreclosure sales as debt collectors gives creditors a loophole under the 
Act to engage in abusive practices.59 The Court rejected this argument reasoning 
that States guard against such practices, for example, by requiring notice to the 
debtor.60 It is up to Congress, and not the judiciary, to determine if these safeguards 
are adequate.61 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
There is a circuit split on the application of the Act to non-judicial foreclosure 
proceedings.62 In Vien–Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., the Ninth Circuit ruled that 
a trustee conducting a non-judicial foreclosure is not a debt collector under the 
Act’s primary definitional provision (and, thus, not subject to the Act’s 
requirements).63 Ho, the debtor, borrowed money from creditor Countrywide Bank 
to buy a home.64 The loan was secured by a deed of trust with ReconTrust acting as 
the Trustee.65 After Ho missed her payments, ReconTrust sent her a Notice of 
Default and, subsequently, a Notice of Sale.66 Ho alleged that the notices violated 
the Act by misrepresenting the amount of money she owed.67 The Ninth Circuit 
rejected Ho’s argument reasoning that ReconTrust was not a debt collector under 
the Act for the following reasons:68 
First, the Act defines debt collectors generally as those who directly or indirectly 
attempt to collect money.69 However, the objective of a non-judicial foreclosure is 
to sell the security interest and foreclose redemption – not to collect money from 
the debtor.70 Although money from the sale is used to pay the creditor, that is not 
 
 59. Id. at 1040. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1035. 
 63. 858 F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 64. Id. at 570. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 570–71. ReconTrust was required to send the Notices to conform with California’s non-judicial 
foreclosure process. See id. (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 2924(a)(1), (3)). 
 67. Id. at 571 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)(2)(A) which says, “A debt collector may not use any false, 
deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without 
limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: . . . The 
false representation of . . . the character, amount, or legal status of any debt . . . .”). 
 68. Id. at 570–76. 
 69. Vien–Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 2016). (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(5), 
(6)). 
 70. Id.  
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the object of the non-judicial foreclosure.71 In fact, in California, a creditor may not 
bring a deficiency action after a foreclosure sale thereby showing that non-judicial 
foreclosure is not annexed to debt collection.72 
Second, if the Act’s general definitional provision included entities enforcing 
security interests, it would render the limited purposes section of § 1692(f)(6) as 
superfluous.73 Lastly, “[h]olding trustees liable under the [the Act] would subject 
them to obligations that would frustrate their ability to comply with the California 
statutes governing non-judicial foreclosure.”74 The court said, “[w]hen one 
interpretation of an ambiguous federal statute would create a conflict with state 
foreclosure law and another interpretation would not, respect for our federal 
system counsels in favor of the latter.”75 Thus, the court ruled that ReconTrust as a 
trustee enforcing a security interest was not a general debt collector under the Act 
and, thus, not subject to the Act.76 
On the other side of the circuit split, in Kaymark v. Bank of Am., the Third Circuit 
ruled that an entity which enforces a security interest is considered a debt collector 
under the Act.77 Dale Kaymark defaulted on a mortgage held by Bank of America 
(“BOA”).78 On behalf of BOA, Udren Law Offices, P.C. (“Udren”) initiated judicial 
foreclosure on Kaymark’s property in state court.79 The foreclosure complaint 
received by Kaymark listed fees which, although were likely to occur, had not 
occurred yet.80  Kaymark alleged that by listing the not-yet-incurred fees on the 
complaint, Udren violated § 1692e(2)(A), (5), (10), and § 1692f(1) of the Act.81  
 
 71. See id.  
 72. Id. The Court makes an analogy to a tow truck which tows a car due to the non-payment of parking 
tickets. Id. Although one may be induced to pay parking tickets from the fear of having his or her car towed, the 
fear of such a towing is not enough to transform the tow truck company into a debt collector. Id. 
 73. Id. at 573. The Act’s general definition of a “debt collector” to whom the Act generally applies to is 
found in 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6). Id. at 572. The Act defines “debt collectors” as those who “regularly collect or 
attempt to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due [to] another.” Id. The 
Act’s limited purpose definition is found in 15 U.S.C. § 1692(f)(6) where the Act specifies that it “also includes” 
entities whose principal business purpose is “the enforcement of security interests.” Id. at 573. 
 74. Id. at 575. The Court says, “[f]or example, the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from communicating 
with third parties about the debt absent consent from the debtor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(c)(b).  But California law 
requires the trustee to announce all trustee’s sales in a newspaper and mail the notice of default to various 
third parties. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2924b(c)(1)–(2), 2924f(b). Moreover, the Act prohibits debt collectors from 
directly communicating with debtors if the debt collector knows that the debtor is represented by counsel. 15 
U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). California law requires the trustee to mail the notices of default and sale directly to the 
borrower, and makes no exception for borrowers who are represented by counsel.” Id. 
 75. Vien–Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568, 576 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 76. Id. at 572. 
 77. 783 F.3d 168, 179 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 78. Id. at 171. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 174. 
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Udren argued that foreclosure actions cannot be the basis of an Act claim since 
“[the Act] has the apparent objective of preserving creditors’ judicial remedies.”82 
The court rejected the argument reasoning that foreclosure meets the definition of 
debt collection under the Act.83 If entities enforcing foreclosure actions were not 
considered debt collectors under the Act, it would create a loophole for debt 
collectors when debt is secured by real property and foreclosure is used to collect 
that interest.84 Additionally, “if a collector were able to avoid liability under the Act 
simply by choosing to proceed in rem rather than in personam, it would undermine 
the purpose of the Act.”85 Lastly, Congress, and not the courts, would have to 
exclude foreclosure proceedings from debt collection given that the plain language 
of the Act seems to indicate that such proceedings are covered.86 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, the Supreme Court correctly held that 
entities enforcing non-judicial foreclosures are not considered debt collectors 
under the Act’s general definitional provision.87 The Court was correct to limit its 
holding to entities enforcing non-judicial, and not judicial, foreclosures.88 However, 
the Court missed an opportunity to reconciliate a circuit split when it left open the 
issue of whether entities enforcing judicial foreclosures are considered debt 
collectors under the Act.89  
A. The Court correctly held that entities enforcing non-judicial foreclosures 
are not considered debt collectors under the Act. 
The Court’s strongest argument supporting its conclusion is its superfluity 
argument.90 Under the Act’s general provision, an entity enforcing a foreclosure 
would qualify as a debt collector since foreclosure is an indirect attempt to collect 
a debt.91 However, the Act’s limited purposes provision specifies entities enforcing 
 
 82. Id. at 178 (citing Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 296 (1995)). 
 83. Kaymark v. Bank of Am., 783 F.3d 168, 179 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. (citing Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., 396 F.3d 227, 236 (3d Cir.2005)). 
 86. Id. The Court also mentions  Glazer v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 704 F.3d 453, 461 (C.A.6 2013) and Wilson 
v. Draper & Goldberg, P. L. L. C. , 443 F.3d 373, 376 (C.A.4 2006) as cases where Circuits have held entities 
enforcing non-judicial foreclosures as covered by the Act. Id.  
 87. 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1040 (2019). 
 88. Id. at 1039. 
 89. See id. See infra text accompanying notes 104–128. 
 90. See Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus, LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1037 (2019); see also Vien–Phuong Thi Ho 
v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568, 573 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 91. Obduskey, 139 S. Ct. at 1036-37. But see ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d at 571 (holding that an entity 
enforcing non-judicial foreclosure is not a “debt collector” under the Act, even “indirectly” since the object of 
non-judicial foreclosure is to sell the security interest and foreclose redemption). 
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security interests as debt collectors for the purposes of the limited provision.92 
Thus, if the Act’s general definition included entities enforcing security interests, it 
would render the limited purposes provision unnecessary.93  
Judge Korman, in his concurrence in part and dissent in part to Vien–Phuong Thi 
Ho v. ReconTrust Co., attempts to combat the superfluity argument by reasoning 
that entities enforcing security interests act in different ways.94 There are entities 
which “enforce security interests yet who do not typically engage in activity that 
would also come within the definition of ‘debt collection.’”95 One example is a tow 
truck driver.96 Additionally, some entities “do not [collect] with sufficient regularity 
to bring them within the definition of ‘debt collector.’”97 However, all entities 
enforcing security interests, including tow truck drivers and those who act 
infrequently, would have been covered under the Act’s general definition.98 Thus, 
the superfluity issue remains unresolved.99   
Judge Korman argues that if trustees are not considered “debt collectors” under 
the Act’s general provision, they will be able to engage in deceptive collection acts 
which is contrary to Congress’s intent in creating the Act.100 However, the majority’s 
holding in Obduskey is “limited to circumstances where an entity enforcing a non-
judicial foreclosure only takes the necessary steps required by state law.”101 Abusive 
debt collection practices can transform such an entity into a debt collector under 
the Act.102 
B. However, the Court missed an opportunity to reconciliate a circuit split 
when it left open the issue of whether entities enforcing judicial 
foreclosures are considered debt collectors under the Act. 
The Supreme Court missed an opportunity to reconciliate the rulings of Kaymark v. 
Bank of Am., and Vien–Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co, when it failed to elaborate 
on the potential difference in terms of what is considered a debt collector between 
 
 92. Obduskey, 139 S. Ct. at 1037. 
 93. Id. 
 94. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d at 583 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 95. Id.  
 96. Vien–Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568, 583 (9th Cir. 2016) ((Korman, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1040–41 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(combating the argument that the specific provision was intended for “repo men” – those who collect personal 
property security interests). 
 99. Id. 
 100. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d at 583–84 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 101. Obduskey, 139 S. Ct. at 1039-40 (majority opinion). 
 102. Id. at 1040. 
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entities enforcing judicial and non-judicial foreclosures.103 In Kaymark, the Court 
considered whether an entity enforcing a judicial foreclosure is a debt collector 
under the Act.104 In ReconTrust Co., the Court considered whether an entity 
enforcing a non-judicial foreclosure is a debt collector under the Act.105 Under the 
Act’s general provision defining who is considered a “debt collector,” any entity 
which attempts to collect a debt indirectly is considered a “debt collector.”106 There 
are two conflicting views as how to evaluate non-judicial foreclosure in connection 
with the general provision.  
One view looks at the overall purpose of non-judicial foreclosure.107 Although 
money collected from a non-judicial foreclosure does not come from the borrower 
(but rather the buyer), that “does not alter the fact that any funds raised would 
come as a result of the elimination of the debtor’s interest and equity in the 
property.”108 A mortgage secures payment of a debt, and foreclosure is “the process 
in which property securing a mortgage is sold to pay off the loan balance due.”109 
Thus, at the very least, enforcing a foreclosure is an indirect means of collecting a 
debt putting it within the purview of the Act’s general definition of debt 
collection.110  
A conflicting view looks squarely to the object of the actual foreclosure sale.111 
It does not contemplate what happens after the non-judicial foreclosure.112 The 
purpose of a nonjudicial foreclosure is “to retake and resell the security, not to 
collect money from the borrower.”113 In fact, without a deficiency action (in some 
states such an action is not allowed after non-judicial foreclosure), the trustee 
cannot collect the rest of the debt from the debtor.114 This is because non-judicial 
foreclosure is not annexed to the debtor’s debt, but purely deals with the security 
interest.115 While it is true that funds collected from the trustee’s sale are used to 
pay off the debt, the purpose of the trustee’s sale is to sell the security interest.116 
 
 103. See id. at 1039 (leaving the potential difference between judicial and non-judicial foreclosure for 
another day). 
 104. See Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A, 783 F.3d 168, 178 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 105. Vien–Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568, 570 (9th Cir. 2016) (majority opinion). 
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The latter view, thus, distinguishes between judicial and non-judicial 
foreclosures.117 A judicial foreclosure comes with an underlying deficiency 
judgment attached to the sale.118 This shows that the object and purpose of judicial 
foreclosure is, at the very least, an indirect attempt to collect money from the 
debtor making an entity bringing a judicial foreclosure a debt collector under the 
Act.119  
The Supreme Court considered this distinction but left the issue open for another 
day.120 However, had the Court distinguished between judicial and non-judicial 
foreclosure, it could have reconciled ReconTrust Co. and Kaymark. ReconTrust Co., 
like Obduskey, dealt with an entity enforcing non-judicial foreclosure.121 Under the 
latter view, such entities are not debt collectors under the Act.122 On the other 
hand, Kaymark dealt with an entity enforcing judicial foreclosure and is thus an 
indirect collector thereby qualifying as a “debt collector” under the Act.123 This 
distinction may also explain the superfluity issue of the Act.124 Perhaps the Act’s 
general definition excludes entities enforcing non-judicial foreclosure and the 
limited purposes provision was meant to include such entities as debt collectors for 
limited purposes.  
C. The Court was correct to limit its holding to entities enforcing non-judicial, 
and not judicial, foreclosures. 
The Court rationale for failing to make a distinction between judicial and non-
judicial foreclosures can perhaps be found in Justice Sotomayor’s concurring 
opinion.125 The purpose of the Act is to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices” 
and “promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection 
abuses.”126 By considering entities enforcing non-judicial foreclosures as covered by 
the Act’s general definition of debt collectors, although excluded by the Act’s 
limited purposes provision, it is less of a stretch for the Court to hold that abusive 
actions taken by such entities qualify as debt collection.127 If non-judicial foreclosure 
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was not an indirect attempt to collect a debt, it may have been harder to consider 
such entities as debt collectors even when they engaged in abusive behaviors.128 
CONCLUSION 
In Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus LLP, in light of statutory construction, 
legislative history, and legislative intent, the Supreme Court correctly held that an 
entity which enforces non-judicial foreclosures is not considered a debt collector 
under the Act’s general definitional provision.129 However, the Court missed an 
opportunity to reconciliate a circuit split when it declined to distinguish between 
entities which enforce non-judicial as opposed to judicial foreclosures.130 
Ultimately, the Court was correct to leave the distinction for another day, since, by 
declining to distinguish between judicial and non-judicial foreclosures, the Court 
was forced to recognize entities enforcing non-judicial foreclosures as covered 
under the Act’s general definitional provision.131 By recognizing such entities as 
covered by the Act’s general definitional provision, it is less of a stretch for the Court 
to rule that entities enforcing non-judicial foreclosures are transformed into debt 
collectors when they engage in abusive debt collection practices.132 
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